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DECEPTIVE RESULTS: WHY MEDIATION
APPEARS TO FAIL BUT ACTUALLY
SUCCEEDS
Scott Sigmund Gartner*
INTRODUCTION
Mediation is one of the most prevalent and commonly touted
forms of international conflict management.1 Yet, compared to other
forms of peacemaking such as bilateral negotiation, international
disputes that receive mediation are less likely to result in peace
agreements, and mediated agreements are more likely to fail.2
Furthermore, data seem to suggest the opposite of what is commonly
believed about specific types of mediation.3 For example, scholars
and policymakers frequently champion civil war mediation by
regional governmental organizations.4 Yet, more than half of all civil
war peace agreements reached through regional governmental
organization mediation fail in less than a week.5 Assessing a wide array

* Scott Sigmund Gartner, Professor of International Affairs, School of
International Affairs and Dickinson School of Law, Pennsylvania State University.
1 Jacob Bercovitch & Scott Sigmund Gartner, Is There Method in the
Madness of Mediation? Some Lessons for Mediators from Quantitative Studies of Mediation, 34
INT’L INTERACTIONS 329, 330 (2006).
2 See id. at 342.
3 See Scott Sigmund Gartner, Signs of Trouble: Regional Organization
Mediation and Civil War Agreement Durability, 73 J. POL. 380, 380 (2011).
4 Id.
5 Id. at 380, 387-88.
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of factors affecting civil war peacemaking, regional organization
mediation is the best predictor of agreement failure.6
Why does mediation seem to have such poor results? It is a
problem of deceptive appearances. A concept called “selection
effects” exerts powerful negative influences on what we observe;
ostensibly suggesting that mediation in general—and regional
governmental organization mediation in particular—produce poor
conflict management outcomes. In reality, appearances deceive; both
mediation overall, and regional governmental organization mediation
in particular, effectively lead to peace.
MEDIATION
Two aspects of international dispute mediation are critical for
understanding these deceptive results: (1) participation in mediation
and adherence to mediated outcomes is voluntary; and (2) mediation
is costly.
A. Voluntary
International dispute mediation is a completely voluntary
process—no judge can order belligerents or a third-party mediator to
participate. The third-party mediator must be willing to offer
assistance, and the belligerents must be willing on their own accord
to accept the third party’s offer to mediate.7 Unlike binding
arbitration, mediation does not require a commitment in advance to
accept an outcome. Adherence to a settlement reached through
mediation requires the voluntary agreement of the disputants.
B. Costs
Mediation costs are “considerable.”8 The costs of mediation
vary with the type of actor. For example, in a civil war, governments
Id. at 387-88.
Molly M. Melin, Scott Sigmund Gartner & Jacob Bercovitch, Fear of
Rejection: The Puzzle of Unaccepted Mediation Offers in International Conflict, CONFLICT
MGMT. & PEACE SCI. (forthcoming 2013).
8 KYLE BEARDSLEY, THE MEDIATION DILEMMA 22 (2011).
6
7
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take a dim view of appearing to increase the stature of insurgents by
sitting with them as apparent equals at the peacemaking table.9
Insurgents might be concerned that they lack any control over
mediation outcomes given their power asymmetry with a standing
government.10 Mediators’ costs include: (1) forgoing other peace
efforts; (2) damage to reputation from failure; (3) political costs; and,
(4) operational expenses.11 Belligerents look at the human, economic,
and diplomatic costs of additional violence, their likelihood of
victory, and the various costs of mediation when considering conflict
resolution.
The voluntary and costly attributes of mediation combine to
create powerful process and selection effects—dynamics essential for
understanding mediation outcomes.
PROCESS AND SELECTION EFFECTS
The distinction between process and selection effects
represents a critical innovation in studies of dispute resolution.12
Mediators can choose among a wide variety of tools when working to
resolve disputes.13
Process Effects. Process effects reflect choices made during
conflict management that directly influence outcomes, such as mediator
9 Molly M. Melin & Isak Svensson, Incentives for Talking: Accepting Mediation
in International and Civil Wars, 35 INT’L INTERACTIONS 249, 254 (2009).
10 BEARDSLEY, supra note 8, at 154.
11 Leslie G. Terris & Zeev Maoz, Rational Mediation: A Theory and a Test,
42 J. PEACE RES. 563, 563-83 (2005). See generally Jacob Bercovitch & Gerald
Schneider, Who Mediates? The Political Economy of International Conflict Management, 37 J.
PEACE RES. 145, 145-65 (2000).
12 See Scott Sigmund Gartner & Jacob Bercovitch, Overcoming Obstacles to
Peace: The Contribution of Mediation to Short-Lived Conflict Settlements, 50 INT’L STUD. Q.
819, 820, 822, 835-36 (2006).
13 See Kyle Beardsley, Using the Right Tool for the Job: Mediator Leverage and
Conflict Resolution, 2 PENN ST. J.L.& INT’L AFF. 57 (2013); Molly M. Melin, When
States Mediate, 2 PENN ST. J.L.& INT’L AFF. 78 (2013); Stephen E. Gent, The Politics
of International Arbitration and Adjudication, 2 PENN ST. J.L.& INT’L AFF. 66 (2013)
(explaining how similar types of choices also affect other dispute resolution
methods, such as arbitration and adjudication).
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strategy. For example, during the negotiations with Egyptian
President Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Begin, U.S. President
Jimmy Carter guaranteed U.S. funding for military bases to both
countries, a move that greatly contributed to the successful Camp
David Peace Accords. Carter’s guaranty is an example of a process
effect—an action that directly influences the mediation outcome.
Process effects have a clear, causal effect on conflict management
results—they shape dispute resolution success and failure.
Selection Effects. Selection effects identify specific
populations of cases that have particular conflict management traits.
For example, imagine there are two types of disputes: hard (difficult
to resolve) and easy (open to resolution). Difficult to resolve disputes
typically involve higher levels of violence, greater stakes and more
intransigent belligerents than easy to resolve disputes. While a great
mediator might achieve success in a hard dispute and a poor mediator
may fail to settle an easily resolvable dispute, on average, hard
disputes are less likely to result in peacemaking success than easy
ones. Thus, identifying the dispute’s type (hard or easy) helps to
predict the likely outcome of any conflict resolution. Selection effects
identify a dispute’s type. They distinguish the population to which
disputes belong; but unlike process effects, they do not directly affect
the conflict management process. Rather, selection effects signal the
conflict’s likely type and thus its odds of a peaceful outcome.14
The difference between selection and process effects can be
illustrated by comparing a student clinic and university hospital.15 The
clinic refers serious cases to the hospital. The hospital treats the high
risk cases—those with a greater chance of resulting in a fatality
(selection effect). The hospital has superior medical resources and
provides better treatment (process effect). Given a serious illnesses,
students go to the hospital, even if its mortality rates are higher.
Students thus take into account (likely without thinking about it)
14 Scott Sigmund Gartner & Molly M. Melin, Assessing Outcomes: Conflict
Management and the Durability of Peace, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK ON CONFLICT
RESOLUTION 564, 564-79 (Jacob Bercovitch et al. eds., 2009).
15 This example is drawn from Scott Sigmund Gartner & Aimee A.
Tannehill, Negotiating with the Dragon: The People’s Republic of China and International
Dispute Settlement Duration, 12 TAMKANG J. INT’L AFF. 69, 69-99 (2008) (Taiwan).
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selection effects; they recognize that the population of patients at the
hospital is sicker and more likely to die than the population of
patients at the clinic. Without consideration of the influence of
selection, one would erroneously determine that the life-saving
abilities of the clinic are superior to that of the hospital, when in fact
the opposite is true.16
SELECTION EFFECTS AND MEDIATION
Because mediation is costly, belligerents try to avoid it.
Disputants who talk between themselves and resolve their differences
on their own do not have to bear the costs of mediation. Thus,
bilateral negotiation between disputants represents the most efficient,
low cost, conflict resolution mechanism. If bilateral negotiations fail
or their differences make them unwilling to work together (for
example, Sadat and Begin refused to be together in the same room
after their first meeting at Camp David), then disputants who want a
peaceful resolution process can turn to a third-party mediator. As a
result, mediators work on tougher cases than those bilaterally
negotiated; disputes that, as a result of the selection process, are less
likely to result in peace. Mediation itself, however, has positive
process effects. An identical dispute would be more likely to result in
peace if it is mediated than if it is not. But in reality, disputes are not
distributed randomly or evenly, among conflict resolution
processes—mediators get the hardest cases, which are more likely to
result in peacemaking failure.

Cf. Lori Guevara, Cassia Spohn & Denise Herz, Race, Legal
Representation, and Juvenile Justice: Issues and Concerns, 50 CRIME & DELINQ. 344, 34445, 347-48, 366 (2004). Selection effects commonly manifest in legal contexts. For
example, juvenile defendants who are not defended by a lawyer are more likely to
have their charges dismissed and less likely to receive a secure confinement
disposition than youth who retain lawyers. A defendant’s lawyer does not have a
negative effect on the case’s outcome; rather, declining counsel signals a low
likelihood of conviction and a low stakes case—selection effects. Id.; see also
Michael Alexander Roach, Explaining the Outcome Gap between Different Types
of Indigent Defense Counsel: Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard Effects Essays
on Heterogeneous Treatments of Defendants within Legal Institutions (June 2011)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University).
16
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When the nature of the dispute is taken into account, analyses
show that international dispute mediation has a positive process
effect on reaching durable agreements.17
SELECTION EFFECTS AND REGIONAL GOVERNMENTAL
ORGANIZATIONS
One way to develop a better understanding of how mediation
exerts deceptive selection effects is to look at a specific type of
mediation. For example, consider civil war mediation by regional
governmental organizations. The Organization of American States,
The African Union, and The Arab League represent examples of
regional governmental organizations. Today, “regional organizations
are the most common type of IOs [International Organizations] in
the world system.”18 As the number of regional organizations has
increased, so has their role in conflict management, and specifically as
mediators. Comparing the periods shortly before and after 1980, the
frequency of regional mediation almost doubled.19
This increase is not surprising given widespread beliefs that
regional organizations represent the ideal mediator type.20 These
beliefs draw on four core arguments. First, regional organization
member states frequently share political, economic, social, and
cultural features with the disputants. Bercovitch and Houston argue
that regional organizations are more likely to achieve conflict
resolution outcomes than other types of mediators because they,
“mediate within the same cultural and value system—and this, it
seems, promotes agreement more than any other factor.”21 United
See Gartner & Bercovitch, supra note 12, at 822-23.
Jon C. Pevehouse, With a Little Help from My Friends? Regional
Organizations and the Consolidation of Democracy, 46 AM. J. POL. SCI. 611, 616 (2002).
19 See Scott Sigmund Gartner, Civil War Peacemaking, in PEACE AND
CONFLICT 2012 71-84 (J. Joseph Hewitt et al. eds., 2012).
20 See T.H.Y. Nguyen, Beyond Good Offices? The Role of Regional Organizations
in Conflict Resolution, 55 J. INT’L AFF. 463, 484 (2002).
21 Jacob Bercovitch & Allison Houston, The Study of International Mediation:
Theoretical Issues and Empirical Evidence, in RESOLVING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS:
THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MEDIATION 11, 27 (Jacob Bercovitch ed., 1995)
(stating a counter to this argument, however, is that regional organizations often
contain their own super or regional powers with super or regional interests that can
17
18
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Nations Security Council Resolution 1809 states, “regional
organizations are well positioned to understand the root causes of
armed conflicts owing to their knowledge of the region which can be
a benefit for their efforts to influence the prevention or resolution of
these conflicts”22 Second, neighboring states have a greater stake in
peacemaking than outsider states or the U.N. and “must live with the
consequences of their work,” which generates higher levels of
commitment and trust.23 Third, disputants are less likely to view
mediation offers from regional governmental organizations as stealth
colonization efforts. Finally, regional governmental organization
charters frequently encourage third-party peacemaking, making them
willing mediators. For example, Article 84 of The Charter of the
Organization of American States directs the Permanent Council to
assist members in the “peaceful settlement of their disputes.”24 For
example, the OAS successfully mediated the Belize-Guatemala
conflict in 2000—a dispute originating from the independence of
Spain in 1839 and which the U.N. failed to resolve.25
There are also aspects of regional organization conflict
mediation that are unattractive to belligerents. Given the inherent
advantages of a sitting government, insurgent success in civil war
requires support from neighboring states.26 The comparatively small
skew mediation. For example, consider the roles of: Nigeria in The African Union,
Egypt in The Arab League, and the U.S. in The Organization of American States).
22 S.C. Res. 1806, U.N. SCOR, 63rd Year, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1809, at 1
(Apr. 16, 2008), http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Coop%20w%20Reg%20Orgs%20SRES
1809.pdf.
23 John Paul Lederach & Paul Wehr, Mediating Conflict in Central America,
28 J. PEACE RES. 85, 97 (1991). See also Marie Olson & Frederic S. Pearson, Civil
War Characteristics, Mediators, and Resolution, 19 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 421 (2002).
24 The Protocol of Amendment to the Charter of the Organization of
American States, “Protocol of Buenos Aires” art. 84, Feb. 27 1967, 21 U.S.T. 607,
721 U.N.T.S. 324, http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_A-41_Charter_of_the_
Organization_of_American_States.pdf.
25 MONSTERRAT GORINA-YSERN, AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L LAW, OAS
MEDIATES
IN
BELIZE-GUATEMALA
BORDER
DISPUTE
(2000),
http://www.asil.org/insigh59.cfm.
26 Dylan Balch-Lindsey, Andrew J. Enterline & Kyle A. Joyce, Third-Party
Intervention and the Civil War Process, 45 J. PEACE RES. 345, 345 (2008); Salehyan
Idean, No Shelter Here: Rebel Sanctuaries and International Conflict, 70 J. POL. 54 (2008).
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size of regional groups ensures all members have influence,
accentuating concerns over bias.27 As a result, governments fighting
civil wars abhor including regional organizations in dispute
negotiations because it provides their insurgent’s benefactors
influence in the conflict management process. Similarly, rebels
recognize that the government they threaten likely plays a major role
in the regional organization. Additionally, some states in the
organization likely have their own insurgency problems and thus
want to come down hard on rebel groups in order to deter challenges
at home.28
Given these disincentives, civil war belligerents prefer to
avoid mediation by regional organizations and only select them in the
most dire circumstances. As a result, regional organizations mediate
particularly deadly and intractable civil wars—those less likely to
result in durable peace agreements. When these selection effects are
controlled for, however, and the intensity of civil wars are taken into
account, mediation by regional organizations has a positive process
effect on peacemaking.29
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Just like the best hospitals get the sickest patients and lose the
most lives, the best peacemakers get the most violent and intractable
disputes that produce the worst peace outcomes. However, when we
take into account the deadly nature and known difficulty of resolving
those international disputes selected for mediation, we see that
mediation generally, and mediation by regional organizations
specifically, facilitate the creation of robust peace agreements.

27 See Isak Svensson, Research on Bias in Mediation: Policy Implications, 2
PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L. AFF. 17 (2013).
28 See Navin A. Bapat, The Internationalization of Terrorist Campaigns, 24
CONFLICT MGMT. & PEACE SCI. 265 (2007). This problem is complicated further
by the frequent shifting preference for violence among ethnic groups. See, e.g.,
Victor Asal & Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Ethnic Conflict: An Organizational Perspective, 2
PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 91 (2013).
29 See Gartner, supra note 3.
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Selection effects have two critical policy implications. First,
selection influences how we should evaluate mediation failure. Some
ineffective mediation is likely the result of poor mediators and weak
peacemaking strategies. But other disappointing results, especially
when generated by mediators and strategies thought to be highly
effective, are likely misleading and result from selection effects. For
example, the Camp David Accords mediated by President Carter in
1978 have led to a peace between Egypt and Israel that has lasted for
more than thirty years—in contrast to the five wars fought between
the two countries in the thirty years prior to the Accords. But the
Accords did not bring comprehensive peace to the region. After
Camp David, mediators found it difficult to make further progress in
this dispute. The Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestinians
have not operated as effectively as the Camp David Accords. Some
might claim that these other mediators lacked Carter’s mediation
skills. It is critical to remember, however, that the Arab-Israeli
dispute remains extremely intractable. While the dispute’s violence
and salience help it to attract the best global mediators they also form
the conditions that make peace elusive. It would be wrong to equate
failure to obtain peace in these disputes with the failure of mediation
generally or the ineffectiveness of any specific mediators. Rather, we
need to keep in mind that the intractable, violent, and globally
important nature of the Arab-Israeli dispute both attracts mediation
and makes it difficult to resolve—an apt illustration of selection
effects. Given that the top mediators get the toughest cases, it is vital
that we keep selection in mind when evaluating mediation efficacy.
Second, potential mediators need to recognize that they face a
trade-off. They can choose to mediate disputes that are likely to be
resolved—but bilateral negotiations may work equally effectively in
these disputes. Or, potential mediators can choose persistent disputes
that are not likely to result in durable peace or civil wars that are
especially challenging to resolve.30 These are the disputes that most
require third-party assistance—they are both the most violent and the
least likely to be resolved through the independent actions of the
See David E. Cunningham, Who Should Be At The Table? Veto Players and
Peace Processes in the Civil War, 2 PENN ST. J.L. INT’L AFF. 38 (2013); J. Michael
Greig, Intractable Syria? Insights from the Scholarly Literature on the Failure of Mediation, 2
PENN ST. J.L. INT’L AFF. 48 (2013).
30
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disputants—but are also the disputes that are most likely to result in
failed mediation outcomes. Resolving these more intractable disputes
requires a frustrating pattern of peacemaking efforts.31 Thus,
mediators need to assess the value of mediation efforts based on the
challenge of the task they face, not only on what they can achieve.
These perspectives should not, however, suggest pessimism
about mediation and peacemaking. Mediation of previously persistent
disputes does not necessarily result in failed peacemaking. For
example, the Colombian government has battled the insurgent group
FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) since 1964.
On March 1, 2008, Colombia attacked a FARC encampment in
Ecuador, expanding the war and enflaming a long-simmering regional
dispute. Viewing the attack as an illegal violation of its sovereignty,
Ecuador cut diplomatic ties with Colombia. Colombia accused the
Ecuadorian and Venezuelan governments of financially supporting
FARC. Tensions intensified when Ecuador and Venezuela sent
troops to the Colombian border.32 The OAS intervened rapidly to
diffuse tensions by calling an emergency session and sending a
commission to visit the countries and investigate the attack. The
OAS determined that Colombia did in fact violate Ecuador’s
sovereignty and territorial integrity. Columbia issued an apology and
the countries resumed diplomatic relations. The OAS launched the
Mission of Good Offices in Colombia and Ecuador which works to
maintain peaceful relations between the two countries.33 Thus,
31 Birger Heldt, The Lack of Coordination in Diplomatic Peacemaking, 2 PENN
ST. J.L.& INT’L AFF. 9 (2013).
32 See Neighbors Cut Ties With Colombia, BBC NEWS, Mar. 4, 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7276228.stm; Simon Romero, Columbia is
Flashpoint in Chavez’s Feud with U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/05/world/americas/05venez.html?pagewante
d=all; LAURA CARLSEN, FOREIGN POLICY IN FOCUS, THE ANDEAN CRISIS (John
Feffer ed., 2008), http://www.fpif.org/articles/the_andean_crisis.
33 See Columbia and Ecuador, OAS PEACE FUND, http://www.oas.org/
sap/peacefund/ColombiaAndEcuador/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2013); Crisis Deepens as
Venezuela Closes Columbia Border, AFP, Mar. 4, 2008, http://afp.google.com/
article/ALeqM5iWzlEd06o1UoIdZxv17wkp18uz4g; TATIANA WAISBERG, AM.
SOC’Y OF INT’L LAW, COLUMBIA’S USE OF FORCE IN ECUADOR AGAINST A
TERRORIST ORGANIZATION: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE
AGAINST NON-STATE ACTORS (2008), http://www.asil.org/insights080822.
cfm#_edn1.
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despite an enduring dispute, a non-governmental actor and a
violation of sovereignty—all factors known to make disputes more
intractable—mediation worked.
For those of us who participate in, study, or encourage
peacemaking efforts, the results frequently seem grim. But we should
not let mediation’s seemingly poor results dissuade us from
promoting peacemaking. Rather, using selection effects we need to
handicap the odds of mediation success and failure. Like many of the
best hospitals, best conflict management practices may at first appear
to be hazardous, but an understanding of the process and its
challenges demonstrates their value and shows that appearances can
indeed be deceptive.
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